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There is ample evidence that people fail to remember their past beliefs correctly. After
having received new information affecting these beliefs, they tend to exaggerate the avail-
ability of their current information to their past selves. Hence, people are not surprised
by new information as they think they knew it all along. This information projection of
recalling one’s past information state incorrectly is called the hindsight bias. Using a novel
experimental design, we show how this behavioral bias affects delegation decisions in a
systematic and predictable fashion. In a principal-agent relationship the hindsight bias has
the paradoxical effect that additional information about the performance of the agent can
increase the inefficiency of the principal’s delegation decision.
Consider the following example in the context of medicine. After a tumor has been diag-
nosed, in hindsight 90 percent of lung cancers and 70 percent of breast cancers are observed
on radiographs that had previously not been recognized (as indicated in a testimony by
the radiologist Berlin 2003). Suppose now that the early radiograph is seen by a subor-
dinate doctor who overlooks the tumor. Suppose further that after the tumor has been
found, a superior who is informed about the diagnosis evaluates the subordinate’s ability
to diagnose cancer. A hindsight-biased superior might forget that she had not detected
the tumor herself. As a consequence, she might underestimate the relative ability of the
young doctor, compared to her own (Madarász 2012). This can induce the supervisor not
to delegate further decisions to the subordinate doctor.
We propose a simple two-period model of a delegation game to demonstrate how the
hindsight bias can result in incorrect evaluations of another person’s relative ability and,
in consequence, to suboptimal delegation decisions. In the game, a principal has to decide
whether to delegate a decision to an agent after having received information about her
ability at an interim stage. To delegate optimally, the principal needs to evaluate the agent’s
ability relative to her own. If the principal is hindsight biased, she accounts differently for
the interim information than if she was rational. A principal’s biased memory of her ex
ante state of information toward the true outcome results in an irrationally high level of
self-confidence and thus to inefficiently little delegation.1
1 The interdependence of confidence issues and delegation decisions has been studied by Bénabou and Tirole (2002)
and Bénabou and Tirole (2003). They show how principals act strategically in order to influence the agent’s self-
confidence and therefore his performance. Our focus, by contrast, is on how the principal’s self-confidence affects her
delegation decisions. For this, we do not need a conflict of interest between the principal and the agent. Hence, in
our setting, the principal and the agent have the same payoffs from the project at hand and ex ante information is
symmetric, so that no problem of moral hazard can occur.
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Our experiment links the hindsight bias as a personal trait to a person’s delegation deci-
sion. The experiment consists of two parts. First, in a prediction game each participant’s
ability to correctly remember her ex ante beliefs is measured. Then, participants take part
in the delegation game based on the model. Having classified subjects as hindsight biased
or rational according to the prediction task, we investigate their delegation decisions in
the delegation game. Indeed, we find that subjects whom we categorize as hindsight biased
delegate significantly less often than other subjects exactly in those situations where the
hindsight bias should prevent delegation, as indicated by the model. In other situations
where the hindsight bias should not affect the delegation decision, we find no significant
difference between subjects whom we have classified as hindsight biased or rational. Thus,
we are able to establish a causal link between the hindsight bias as a personal trait and
suboptimal delegation decisions. To our knowledge, this is the first paper that documents
a relationship between hindsight bias and delegation.
We contribute to two separate strands of the literature. First, our study relates to the
literature on optimal delegation and on interim information in multi-period principal-agent
relationships. In principle, receiving interim information in such relationships is considered
useful for the principal in order to mitigate the problems of asymmetric ex ante information
(Strausz 2006) and uncertainty (Dessein 2005). For instance, venture capital contracts
should account for interim information about the agent: If the initial authority is with the
entrepreneur, control rights can be shifted to the venture capitalist later on if unfavorable
information about the entrepreneur’s ability is released at intermediate stages (Chan et al.
1990). Empirically, the venture capitalist has the more control rights the more uncertain
he is about the quality of the project or the entrepreneur’s ability (Kaplan and Strömberg
2004). However, this literature presupposes that principals are fully rational and correctly
account for all current and past information available to them when making their delegation
decisions. If the principals are hindsight biased, receiving new information can distort their
relative performance evaluation and hence lead to inefficient delegation decisions. This
renders interim information less useful, or even harmful.
The decision as to whether to delegate control rights can be influenced by several fac-
tors, such as informational advantages of the agent, the principal’s disutility from taking a
decision perceived as unkind (Bartling and Fischbacher 2012), as well as the desire of the
principal to create incentives for effort provision by the agent when there is a conflict of
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interest (Aghion and Tirole 1997). An experimental test of the model by Aghion and Tirole
(1997) has shown that agents respond to control rights more strongly than predicted with
respect to their effort choice, i.e., they underexert effort relative to the equilibrium predic-
tion without control and they overexert effort when they have the decision right. Although
this profile of effort choices makes delegation relatively attractive for the principals, very
often the majority of them retain control when they would have received higher returns by
delegating authority. Fehr et al. (forthcoming) summarize: ”We find a strong behavioral
bias among principals to retain authority against their pecuniary interests and often to the
disadvantage of both the principal and the agent.[...] Our results suggest that authority has
non-pecuniary consequences that inhibit the reallocation of authority.” This phenomenon
is in line with the psychological findings on agents’ desire for self-determination (Ryan and
Deci 2000).
The second strand of literature to which our study contributes is work on the hind-
sight bias itself. All economic studies on the hindsight bias, including our own, build on
psychological experiments by Fischhoff (1975), Fischhoff and Beyth (1975), and many oth-
ers, summarized in the meta-analysis by Guilbault et al. (2004). The vast literature has
demonstrated the bias in a number of very different contexts and designs. Our study is
most closely related to two experiments that establish a relationship between information
projection and economic behavior. In an asset market experiment, Camerer et al. (1989)
show that compared to individual decisions the curse of knowledge is reduced by a market
environment, but that it is not entirely eliminated. In another study on asset markets
by Biais and Weber (2009), subjects were informed of the current prices of a number of
assets and had to predict the price of these assets one week later. When asked to recall
their prediction after being informed of the actual price, subjects underestimated their
uncertainty. In a second experiment with investment bankers, the authors show that more
hindsight-biased managers earn less money. The most comprehensive theoretical treatment
of the projection bias is the model by Madarász (2012). It shows how optimal incentives
need to be adjusted in the presence of agents prone to information projection in a number
of different contexts.
In the following, we will first introduce the simple model of the delegation game. It allows
us to derive hypotheses concerning the choices of fully rational Bayesian and hindsight-
biased players. In Section 3, the experimental design is described, and in Section 4, we
present the empirical results. Section 5 concludes with a discussion of the findings.
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Figure 1 Timeline of the delegation game.
2. Principal-Agent Framework
We present a simple model to investigate under which conditions people who are prone to
the hindsight bias take inefficient delegation decisions. For the hindsight bias to manifest
itself, at least two periods are necessary. This two-period game is summarized in Figure 1.
First, nature draws the type θj of the principal (P) and of the agent (A), with j ∈ {P,A}.
Both can be either a good type, θ
j
, or a bad type, θj, and the type remains constant for the
two periods. Types are drawn independently, and their prior probability of being a good
type is rP for the principal and rA for the agent, respectively. Neither the principal nor the
agent know their own type. At the beginning of each period t ∈ {1,2}, nature draws the
state of the world, ωt ∈ {0,1}. States of the world are drawn independently across periods,
and the two possible realizations, 0 and 1, are equally likely.
In the first period, the principal and the agent each receive a private signal sj1, j ∈ {P,A},
about the true state of the world. The quality of the signal, i.e., the probability ρ that the
signal corresponds to the true state of the world, depends on the type θj of the player j.
A good type θ
j
receives signals that are correct with probability ρ whereas a bad type’s
signals are only correct with probability ρ, where 0.5≤ ρ < ρ≤ 1. After having observed
his signal in the first period, the agent has to take an action a1 ∈ {0,1}. If this action
corresponds to ω1, both the agent and the principal receive a positive payoff z. If the action
was incorrect, both receive zero payoffs.
At the beginning of the second period, the principal learns the agent’s action a1, and
the true state of the world ω1 that prevailed in the first period is revealed. The principal
updates her belief about her own and the agent’s type. Then, she decides whether she
herself or the agent will make the next decision. If she opts for delegation, the agent will
receive a private signal sA2 about the state of the world ω2 ∈ {0,1} in the second period and
5
will choose an action a2 ∈ {0,1}. If the principal decides herself, she receives a signal sP2
about ω2, and chooses an action a2 ∈ {0,1} herself. Both players again receive the positive
payoff z, if a2 turns out to correspond to ω2, but zero otherwise. Then, the game ends.
Subjects derive a positive utility from being in control of their own situation. This has
been found by psychologists and is stated as the theory of self-determination (Ryan and
Deci 2000). The wish to retain decision rights and control over oneself is traced back
to human desire and the need for autonomy, personal development, and self-regulation.
Moreover, such an additional utility derived from the right to make decisions has also
manifested itself in previous delegation experiments in economics (Fehr et al. forthcoming,
Owens et al. 2012). To account for this, we introduce a variable v ∈ R+which denotes a
psychic payoff from being in control. To account for unobserved heterogeneity of individu-
als, we assume that nature draws v at the beginning of the game for each player according
to some continuous distribution F (v) , with F ′ (v) > 0. These psychic payoffs are drawn
independently for all players.
Since we want to test whether hindsight-biased individuals delegate too little, we make
delegation attractive for rational decision makers. In particular, we assume that the ex
ante likelihood rj of being a good type θ
j
is smaller for the principal than for the agent,
rP < rA < 1. Hence, ex ante, the agent is better at predicting the true state of the world.
Moreover, we assume that the principal’s payoff from an action that matches the state
of the world is lower if she does not delegate the decision, i.e. the payoff of a correct
decision that she has taken herself is zND = z− c, with c > 0. The parameter c symbolizes
opportunity costs in monetary terms. We assume that the principal has a per-period utility
linear in the monetary payoff as well as in the non-pecuniary utility of self-determination,
denoted by UD = z if she delegates the decision and by UND = zND + v if she does not.2
To solve the model, we will determine the probability that the principal delegates the
second-period decision based on the parameters of the game and the distribution F (.).
Finally, we turn to the delegation decision of a potentially hindsight-biased principal.
A hindsight-biased principal will not remember in the second period that her signal was
sP1 in the first period. Her remembered signal is a weighted average of her past signal and
the true state of the world that has been revealed in the meantime. Thus, she will believe
2 Of course, also the agent potentially receives some utility of self-determination and the payoff. However, as we are
only interested in the principal’s delegation decision, we leave his utility aside.
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that she saw s̃P1 = s
P
1 (1−λ) + λω1, with 0≤ λ≤ 1. In the extreme case, when λ= 1, she
will think that she received a signal s̃P1 equal to the state of the world ω1. As the state
of the world and the signal realizations are binary, we restrict the analysis to the case of
λ= 1 for the hindsight-biased and λ= 0 for the rational principal. Note that the hindsight
bias can only affect the principal’s posterior beliefs about her own type if the signal sP1
contradicts the state of the world ω1, because otherwise no distortion of the remembered
signal is possible.
2.1. The delegation game
We apply the equilibrium concept of Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium: Given their
beliefs, all players make optimal decisions at all information sets; and they update their
beliefs according to Bayes’ rule whenever it is defined. The game has multiple equilibria,
but for reasons of plausibility, we restrict attention to the (unique) pure-strategy equilib-
rium in which the agent always follows his signal in the first period, i.e., sA1 = a1. To derive
this equilibrium, consider the principal’s delegation decision, and assume that the agent
followed his signal in t= 1. Four cases must be distinguished. In two cases, the principal’s
signal and the agent’s action in the first period correspond, that is, they are both either 0
or 1. In the two other cases, the principal’s signal and the agent’s action in the first period
contradict each other, i.e., the principal’s signal is 0 and the agent’s action is 1 or vice
versa.
2.1.1. Case 1: ω1 6= sP1 = sA1 = a1
Suppose that both the principal and the agent have received an incorrect signal about
the state of the world ω1. Consider first the rational principal indicated by the subscript
R. We calculate the critical value v̄R of the utility from self-determination at which the
rational principal is just indifferent between delegating and not delegating in period 2.




sj2 = ω2 | θj = θ
j
}
= ρ and (1)
Pr
{
sj2 = ω2 | θj = θj
}
= ρ for j ∈ {A,P} .
Since both the agent and the principal obtained an incorrect signal in the first period,
































































We now define the critical value v̄R to be that level of utility from self-determination at
which the rational principal is indifferent between delegating and not delegating:
(z− c+ v̄R)pNDR = zpDR . (4)
The rational principal refrains from delegation if and only if her utility from self-
determination exceeds v̄R.
Consider now the hindsight-biased principal, indicated by the subscript H. Her posterior
belief about the agent’s type is rational and given by (3). But since she wrongly believes
that she has received the correct signal in period 1 (s̃P1 = ω1), her posterior belief about
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. (5)
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By contrast, if the hindsight-biased principal delegates, her expected payoff from del-








= zpDR . Consequently,
the hindsight-biased principal refrains from delegation if and only if her utility from self-
determination exceeds the critical value v̄H which is defined by the following equation:
(z− c+ v̄H)pNDH = zpDR . (7)
We now proceed to analyzing how the hindsight bias affects the principal’s propensity to
delegate. To do so, we compare the critical values at which the rational and the hindsight-
biased principal are indifferent between delegating and not delegating. From (4) and (6),
we can infer that
(z− c+ v̄R)pNDR = (z− c+ v̄H)pNDH . (8)
Using simple algebra, one can show that pNDR is strictly smaller than p
ND
H . Consequently,
(8) implies that v̄R must be strictly greater than v̄H . Since F
′ (v) > 0, we formulate our
first prediction:
Theoretical Prediction 1. Let ω1 6= sP1 = sA1 = a1. Then, the probability of delega-
tion is strictly lower for the hindsight-biased principal than for the rational principal.
Intuitively, the hindsight-biased principal fails to recognize that she is less likely to be
a good type compared to the agent when she received an incorrect signal and the agent
chose the incorrect action. As a consequence, she believes that she is more likely than the
agent to get a correct signal in the second period. A rational principal, in contrast, would
recognize that her probability of being a good type is lower than the agent’s probability
if both received an incorrect signal. Therefore, the critical value of the utility from self-
determination making it just optimal to delegate is lower for the hindsight-biased than for
the rational principal.
We now proceed to analyzing the case in which both the principal and the agent receive
a correct signal in the first period.
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Suppose that both the principal and the agent received a correct signal about the state
of the world in period 1. In this case, there is no scope for the hindsight bias to affect
updated beliefs as the principal’s signal was correct and, hence, her remembered signal does
not differ from the actual one. Therefore, the hindsight-biased and the rational principal
have precisely the same belief about their own type. In fact, this belief corresponds to the
belief that the hindsight-biased principal holds about her own type in Case 1 in which she
remembers having received a correct signal. Now, in Case 2, her period-1 signal was in fact
correct leading to the same belief. The principal’s belief about the agent’s type is unaffected
by a potential hindsight bias, i.e., the agent is good with probability r
Aρ
rAρ+(1−rA)ρ . Thus, in
Case 2 the hindsight-biased principal always has the same expected utility as the rational
principal from delegating or not delegating. Calculations analogous to those conducted in
the analysis of Case 1 for the cutoff values v̄H and v̄R reveal that either principal (biased
or not) refrains from delegation if and only if her utility from self-determination exceeds a














This provides us with our second prediction:




1 = a1. Then, the probability of delega-
tion is the same for the hindsight-biased and for the rational principal.
2.1.3. Case 3 and 4: ω1 = s
P
1 6= sA1 = a1 and ω1 6= sP1 6= sA1 = a1
In the two remaining cases, the agent and the principal have received different signals in
the first period. We do not discuss these cases in detail. They are, however, similar to the
two cases analyzed above: As before, the hindsight bias affects the delegation probability if
and only if the principal’s signal in the first period was incorrect. Thus, the remaining two
cases do not add any additional insights into how the hindsight bias affects the propensity
to delegate. We therefore restrict attention to Case 1 and 2 and choose the experimental
design accordingly (see Section 3.2).
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2.1.4. Equilibrium analysis and hypotheses
So far, we have assumed that the agent always follows his signal in the first period. We
now argue that this is indeed an equilibrium strategy. Consider the agent when he has
just received his signal in the first period. At that moment, all he knows about his type is
that he is, a priori, more likely than the principal to get the correct signal in any period.
Thus, his expected second-period payoff increases in the probability of delegation, even if
his utility from self-determination is zero. The probability of delegation, however, increases
in the principal’s posterior belief that the agent is a good type. (Note that this is true
regardless of whether the principal is rational or hindsight-biased.) But given that, in the
second period, the principal believes that the agent has followed his signal, the theoretical
predictions above imply that the principal’s trust in the agent will be highest if the agent
chooses the action that matches the state of the world in period one. This, again, becomes
more likely to be achieved if the agent follows his signal. The expected first-period payoff of
the agent also increases in the probability of matching the state of the world and therefore
in the probability with which the agent follows his signal. Consequently, the agent always
strictly prefers to follow his signal, given that he is expected to do so. Note that any player
who chooses the action in the second period has a strict incentive to follow his or her
signal. We get
Proposition 1. The game has a Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium in pure strategies
in which the agent always follows his signal in the first period, the principal follows her
signal in the second period if she does not delegate, and the agent follows his signal in the
second period if the principal delegates. The principal refrains from delegation in Case 1
[Case 2] if and only if she is either rational and her utility from self-determination exceeds
v̄R [v] or if she is hindsight-biased and her utility from self-determination exceeds v̄H [v].
Note that this equilibrium is not unique: Consider a situation in which the principal
believes that the agent always chooses the action that was not indicated by his signal in
the first period, although the agent would follow his signal in the second period. Moreover,
assume that the agent has infinite utility from self-determination. Then, all that the agent
cares about in the first period is maximizing the likelihood of delegation. Thus, he wants
to maximize the posterior belief of the principal that he, the agent, is a good type. Given
the principal’s beliefs, this is only possible if the agent does not follow his signal in the
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first period, thereby justifying the principal’s belief. It is possible to find parameters for
which this is an equilibrium. However, this equilibrium is implausible because in reality,
competence is rarely signaled by failures. Thus, we restrict attention to the equilibrium
that is characterized by the above theoretical predictions.
From our theoretical predictions, we can derive the two main hypotheses that we test in
the experiment:
Hypothesis 1. If both the agent and the principal receive an incorrect signal in the first
period (Case 1), then the hindsight-biased principal is strictly less likely to delegate in the
second period than the rational principal.
Hypothesis 2. If both the agent and the principal receive a correct signal in the first
period (Case 2), then the hindsight-biased principal is as likely to delegate in the second
period as the rational principal.
3. Experimental Implementation
3.1. Specification of the delegation game















If we evaluate the critical values v̄R, v̄H and v for this specification of the parameters,
we can derive the expected utility of delegation and non-delegation.









for a rational and a hindsight-biased principal in Case 1
(left panel) and Case 2 (right panel). ∆E(U) depends on the principal’s utility from self-
determination, v. If ∆E(U)> 0, the principal opts for delegation. The dashed lines depict








; the dotted lines rep-








. In Case 1 (left
panel) a rational principal chooses to delegate if 1.47< v < 5.09, whereas a hindsight-biased
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Figure 2 Difference between expected utility from delegation and non-delegation depending on utility from
self-determination.
principal does not delegate for these values of v. In Case 2 (right panel) all principals opt
for delegation if v < 5.18, no matter whether they are biased or not.3
Based on these findings, we state the following Observations that we can test in addition
to the two hypotheses derived in the previous section:
Observations
(i) Rational principals show similar delegation rates in Case 1 and Case 2.
(ii) Hindsight-biased principals are less likely to delegate after both players receive incor-
rect signals (Case 1) than after correct signals (Case 2).
(iii) When comparing delegation rates in Case 2 and Case 1, hindsight-biased principals
show a stronger decrease in delegation rates than rational principals.
3.2. Experimental Procedure
In order to identify the effects of the hindsight bias on delegation decisions, we conducted
an online experiment during the FIFA World Cup 2010. The experiment consisted of two
stages. In the first stage, participants had to answer a questionnaire and played the first
3 Note that the parameters are chosen such that a principal with no utility from self-determination, v = 0, wants
to delegate in Case 1 and Case 2, regardless of whether she is rational or hindsight-biased. Because we know that
individuals derive non-pecuniary utility from having the right to decide, v > 0, we wanted to avoid a situation where
principals almost never delegate the decision to the agent. Thus, we have chosen the parameters such that we can
expect enough variation in delegation decisions across treatments.
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part of the delegation game. This stage was conducted during the preliminary round of
the FIFA World Cup 2010. The second stage consisted of another questionnaire and the
second part of the delegation game, starting directly after the semi-finals of the World Cup
(see Figure 3). The two-stage design was necessary to allow for a biased memory.
June 19 June 26
Start of the World Cup
Start of the1st stageof theexperiment:
July 7
End of semi finals
July 8 July 12
End of the World Cup and end of thesecondstage
2010




§ recalled answersto thequestionnaire
§ revelation of stateof world in stageone
§ principals‘delegation decision (and
acquisition decision)
§ revelation of outcomes
Start of the knockout stage and end of the first stageof theexperiment
June 11
Figure 3 Timeline of the Experiment.
In order to measure a participant’s hindsight bias we asked the following questions
regarding outcomes of the ongoing championship during the preliminary round:
1. “What is the likelihood of [nation] reaching the final of the World Cup 2010?”
2. “How many goals will be scored during the eighth-final, quarter-final and semi-final
(within regular playing time, 14 matches overall)?”
For the first question, which we will refer to as the ‘finals task’, we specified the nation
to be Argentina, Spain, and Germany, respectively. We chose to ask this question for each
of the three countries as we hoped that at least one of them would indeed reach the final,
because previous studies have shown that the hindsight bias is stronger if a certain event
turns out to be true than when it turns out not to be true (Fischhoff 1975, Slovic and
Fischhoff 1977, Fischhoff and Beyth 1975).4 The question concerning the number of goals
4 We also added the question “What is the likelihood of Italy dropping out before the semi-final of the World Cup
2010?” to introduce some variation in the questions. However, already during the first stage of the experiment, it
was already clear that Italy would not make it to the knock-out round. This rendered the question useless for our
purposes. In addition, we asked participants about their relative certainty regarding the goals task and about their
favorite team in the World Championship. We did not use these two questions for the analysis.
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(‘goals task’) provided us with a slightly different test for the hindsight bias not based
on a binary outcome variable. About two weeks later, when the semi-finals were over and
the second stage of our experiment started, the participants had to recall their answers
to the questions above.5 Before stating their answers, subjects were told the true outcome
for each question. The order of the questions was different in this second questionnaire to
prevent subjects from recalling their estimates simply due to their ordering. In order to
incentivize participants at the first stage, we raffled five sets of two tickets for the “11-
Freunde-WM-Quartier”, a popular place in Berlin for the public viewing of World Cup
matches. For the memory task at the second stage, we paid 100 Euro to the 10 subjects
who best remembered their answers of stage one. It turned out that 14 subjects perfectly
remembered their answers, and we decided to pay all of them 100 Euro.
In addition to answering the questionnaire, the participants played the delegation game
described in section 2.1. The game was framed as the interaction between a manager
(principal) and a coach (agent) of a soccer club in two subsequent seasons. In each period,
a decision about the acquisition of a particular new player for the soccer club had to be
taken. The state of the world in each season was the true talent of this new player. It is
optimal to acquire a talented player, but an untalented player should not be acquired. The
private signals of the principal and the agent were framed to be advice about the talent of
the new player received through a (good or bad) personal talent scout. As in the model,
the quality of the signal depended on the principal’s and the agent’s type. That is, with
the parameters above, the talent scout advising the manager was good in 40% of cases
(rP = 0.4) and the scout advising the coach was good in 50% of cases (rA = 0.5). A good
talent scout gave a correct advice in two-thirds of cases (ρ= 2/3) whereas a bad talent




. The talent scout of the manager
and the coach, respectively, remained the same for the two periods of the game.
The first 24 participants of the experiment who logged in were assigned to be agents,
and all other participants were principals. As our main interest is in the decisions of the
principals, we replicated the decisions of the agents and matched them to the principals
accordingly (e.g., the first agent was matched to principals with numbers 1, 25, 49, etc.).
Upon logging in, the participants had to answer the questions regarding the World Cup,
5 Before answering the questions, participants were informed that they would be approached again in about two weeks
from then, without knowing what they would be have to do in the second stage.
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read the instructions of the delegation game, and were informed of their role. Both the
principals and the agents received their private signal, i.e., they were given an advice from
their talent scout. Then, the agents had to make the decision whether or not to buy the
new player for the team in this season. This decision was revealed to the principal they were
matched to. The agents had to decide whether to acquire a new player for the second season
after they had received a new signal about the new player’s talent. While their decision
for the first season was implemented for certain, the implementation of their decision for
the second season depended on whether the principal had decided to delegate this decision
to the agent in the second stage. Hence, we applied the strategy method for the agents’
decision in order to avoid having to rely on their participation in the second stage.
About two weeks later at the second stage of the experiment, all participants who had
completed the first stage, were asked to recall and write down their answers to the questions
regarding the World Cup from the first stage. In addition, the principals had to complete
the delegation game. First, they learned the state of the world in the first stage (i.e.,
whether the new player was talented or not). Further, the principals were reminded of
the agent’s decision, but not of their private signal in the first stage. The principals then
had to decide whether or not to delegate the decision concerning the acquisition of a new
player for the second season. If they decided to take the acquisition decision themselves,
they received a signal about the talent of the second new soccer player. Then they were
asked whether or not they wanted to buy this player. If they had delegated the decision
to the agent, the (already elicited) decision of their agent was implemented. At the end of
the second stage, all participants were informed about the true state of the world and the
outcome of their decisions.
In order to incentivize the participants in the delegation game, 10 randomly drawn
subjects were paid according to their decisions in this game. A randomly drawn subject in
the role of an agent received 75 Euro for a correct decision and nothing otherwise, both in
stage one and two. For example, if the agent in the first stage decided to buy the player
and this turned out to be the correct decision (i.e., the player was talented), the agent
received 75 Euro. If the agent decided not to buy the player in the second stage and the
player turned out not to be talented, the agent earned another 75 Euro. A randomly drawn
subject in the role of the principal received 75 Euro for a correct decision of her matched
agent in a stage one. In addition, this principal received 75 Euro for the second stage, if
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she had delegated the decision to her matched agent and it was correct, whereas she only
received 72 Euro for a correct decision if she had not delegated the decision to the agent
but had decided herself. Together with the incentives from the memory task, participants
could earn up to 250 Euro.
We recruited subjects via a call for participation in the sports section of the Berlin
newspaper Der Tagesspiegel and from the subject pool of the experimental lab at Technical
University Berlin using the recruiting tool ORSEE (Greiner 2004). In total 419 subjects
participated in the experiment. After logging into the online experiment, subjects received
instructions on their computer screen and were asked to read them carefully.6
As we used the decision of the agents for multiple principals, it was necessary for the
underlying true state of the world to be the same for the agents and their matched prin-
cipals. Thus, to keep things simple, we randomly drew the state of the world upfront for
both periods and implemented this draw for all participants. The random draw determined
that it was beneficial to buy the new soccer player in each season. Given these states of
the world in periods 1 and 2, we determined the types of the principals and the agents as
well as their signals according to the probabilities specified in Section 3.1. As we wanted
to generate a large number of observations for Case 1 and Case 2, we matched the agents
and the principals according to their signal realization in the first period whenever pos-
sible. This, of course, implies that the signal realizations of principals and agents are not
independent unlike in the model.7 However, as the subjects played the game only once,
they were not able to draw any inferences concerning the dependence of the signals.
4. Results
In the following we will present our results along the lines of the predictions derived above.
4.1. Descriptive statistics of memory tasks
The distributions of the actual and the recalled predictions in the finals and the goals task
are depicted in Figure 4.8 Regarding the finals task, we had fortunately asked for one of
the actual participants in the final, namely Spain. The average likelihood subjects assigned
6 For the instructions (translated from German) see Appendix B.
7 In fact, only five principals received private signals different from their matched agent signal in the first period.
However, five agents did not follow their signal when making the acquisition decision in the first period. Hence, only
303 out of 395 principals received a signal in line with the observed action by the agent.
8 Gaussian kernels are used for the density estimates. The selected bandwidths are 0.04 (panel A) and 1.8 (panel B).
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ex ante to Spain’s participation in the finals was 32.5%. After Spain was known to be
participating in the finals, the subjects’ average recalled likelihood assessment was 39.6%.
A Wilcoxon signed-rank test confirms a significant shift in the distribution of recalled like-
lihood assessments toward the actual outcome (p < 0.0001). However, there is considerable
heterogeneity on the individual level: 26.1% of the subjects are unbiased as they remember
their prediction correctly, 51.1% of the subjects’ behavior is in line with the hindsight bias
as they report recalled predictions that are higher than their actual predictions, and a
considerable fraction of 22.8% of the subjects report recalled predictions that are lower
than they actually were. As these subjects behave neither in line with rational behavior
nor with the hindsight bias, we refer to them as “unclassified” and report results regarding
their behavior separately.9
For Argentina and Germany who did not reach the final, we did not observe any com-
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Figure 4 Kernel density estimates of actual predictions (solid lines) and recalled predictions (dashed lines) of
Spain’s likelihood of entering the final (panel A) and the number of goals (panel B). Solid vertical lines indicate
the true values of the true outcomes (1 and 37 respectively).
A similar pattern is observed for the goals task. First note that 79.7% of the subjects
underestimated the true number of goals shot during the eighth-, quarter- and semi final
(37). In line with the hindsight bias, the mean of the recalled predictions (34.3) is larger
9 Among the biased subjects the fraction of unclassified subjects is significantly lower than the fraction of hindsight-
biased subjects (binomial test, p < 0.0001).
10 For Argentina, the distributions of predictions and recalled predictions are virtually the same. For Germany, the
recalled predictions are significantly higher than actual predictions on average although Germany failed to participate
in the finals.
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than the mean of the actual predictions (31.0). Again, a Wilcoxon signed-rank test indi-
cates that this shift in the distributions is significant (p < 0.0001). On the individual level
we find 22.5% rational subjects who remember their prediction accurately, 43.5% of the
subjects behave in line with the hindsight bias as their recalled predictions are closer to
the actual outcome of 37, and 33.9% cannot be classified as they behave contrary to either
prediction.11
As we attempt to correlate the degree of hindsight biasedness as an individual character-
istic with the choices in the delegation game, we assess the consistency of both measures.
We find that both measures are significantly dependent12: About 50% of the subjects who
remembered their prediction in the goals task correctly show some degree of hindsight bias
in the finals task, while 73% of the subjects who take hindsight-biased decisions in the
goals task are hindsight biased in the finals task as well. As the dependence between the
two tasks is significant but not perfect, we introduce an additional classification of sub-
jects based on both prediction tasks together. Here, we classify a subject as rational if and
only if she remembered her predictions correctly in both tasks (9% of all subjects) and as
hindsight biased if she was classified as hindsight biased in one of the tasks and as rational
or hindsight biased in the other (41% of all subjects). Just as for the measure based on
one of the tasks alone, we do not consider subjects with a biased recall that contradicts
the hindsight bias.
Since we observe some extreme choices in both prediction tasks, we will also investigate
the effect of outliers as a robustness check. For example, regarding the finals task one
subject assessed Spain’s likelihood of attending the finals as 3% in the first place and
then recalled it as being 100% after Spain was known to be participating. Another subject
estimated the number of goals scored during the eighth-, quarter- and semi-final to be 210
and remembered her prediction as being 60 after the true outcome of 37 was announced.
Grubbs’ test for outliers identifies four extreme observations that are relevant for our
analysis.13 Although we do not exclude theses observations in our main analysis below, we
report on those instances where their deletion affects the results.
11 Again, among the biased subjects the fraction of unclassified subjects is significantly lower than the fraction of
hindsight-biased subjects (binomial test, p= 0.0342).
12 We run a probit regression with a dummy indicating hindsight-biased behavior in the goals task as the dependent
variable and a corresponding dummy for the finals task as the independent variable (unclassified subjects were
excluded, standard errors were corrected for clusters on the individual level). A test of the finals task dummy against
zero yields p= 0.001.
13 A full list of the outliers in the prediction and memory tasks together with the corresponding delegation decisions
can be found in Appendix A.1. Note that six of these 10 observations are classified as unexplained and are thus not
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4.2. Effect of hindsight bias on delegation behavior
Out of 395 participants in the role of the principal, 303 were in a situation where their
private signal corresponded to the agent’s action (Case 1 and 2). Out of those, 229 (203)
can be classified as being either rational or hindsight biased based on the finals task (goals
task). As our model does not yield any predictions regarding unclassified subjects, these
observations are excluded from the analysis. Based on the combination of both tasks, 150
subjects can be classified.
Table 1 gives an overview of the principals’ delegation rates conditioned on their available
information and their classification based on the (combined) tasks. First, we note that the
delegation rates support our assumption that subjects derive a positive utility from self-
determination, as delegation rates should be 100% without such a non-pecuniary utility
both for rational and hindsight-biased principals.
Table 1 Delegation rates by task, principal’s type and information.
Finals task (n=229) Goals task (n=203) Combined (n=150)
Information Rational Biased Rational Biased Rational Biased
Case 1 (ω1 6= sP1 = a1) 66.7% ( 2436 ) 55.2% ( 3767 ) 75.9% ( 2229 ) 55.4% ( 3665 ) 81.8% ( 911 ) 55.9% ( 3359 )
Case 2 (ω1 = s
P
1 = a1) 71.8% ( 2839 ) 70.1% ( 6187 ) 67.4% ( 2943 ) 66.7% ( 4466 ) 60.0% ( 915 ) 76.9% ( 5065 )
In line with Hypothesis 1, the table shows that irrespective of the method of categorizing
subjects as hindsight biased or rational, the delegation rates are lower for hindsight-biased
principals than for rational principals in situations where the principal and the agent both
received incorrect signals (Case 1). Furthermore, in line with Hypothesis 2, the table reveals
that the delegation rates for rational and hindsight-biased subjects are very similar when
the agent’s decision coincides with the state of the world (Case 2) except for the combined
categorization. Regarding the comparisons across cases as stated in Observations (i), (ii),
and (iii), we find that the differences in the delegation rates of rational principals are
not directed in a systematic manner across categorization methods. We interpret this as
weak support for Observation (i) as we would expect – if anything – a very small decrease
when moving from Case 2 to Case 1. The results are very clear concerning Observation (ii)
relevant for our main results. Although the Shapiro-Wilk tests reject normality for the distributions of the differences
between recalled and actual predictions for both tasks (which could be due to the outliers besides non-normality of
the population), Grubbs’ test is applied in order to employ a nonarbitrary criterion for the exclusion of apparently
extreme observations.
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as hindsight-biased principals show lower delegation rates in Case 1 compared to Case 2
for each classification method. Finally, note that these decreases in delegation rates when
moving from Case 2 to Case 1 are always larger for hindsight-biased than for rational
principals, just as predicted by Observation (iii).
In order to test the hypotheses, we employ probit regressions for each classification with
the principals’ probability to delegate as the dependent variable and a constant, a dummy
variable for Case 1, a dummy variable for principals classified as hindsight biased and an
interaction of both dummies as independent variables.14 Table 2 shows Wald tests of the
differences between delegation rates obtained by proper transformations of the estimated
coefficients.15
Table 2 Differences in delegation rates by type and information of principals.
Finals task Goals task Both tasks
Hypothesis 1: π1H −π1R < 0 -0.114 -0.205** -0.259**
Hypothesis 2: π2H −π2R = 0 -0.017 -0.008 0.169
Observation (i): ∆R := π
1
R−π2R ≈ 0 -0.051 0.084 0.218
Observation (ii): ∆H := π
1
H −π2H < 0 -0.149** -0.113* -0.210***
Observation (iii): ∆H −∆R < 0 -0.098 -0.197* -0.428**
Note: Bold values represent results in line with our hypothesis. πkl denotes the delegation
rates with k ∈ {1, 2} for case 1 and case 2 and l ∈ {R,H} for rational and hindsight-biased
principals respectively. The p-values are based on Wald tests: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p <
0.01.
The first row in the table lends support to Hypothesis 1. In Case 1, hindsight-biased
principals delegate less often than rational principals (significant for the goals-task clas-
sification and the combined classification). Furthermore, in line with Hypothesis 2, the
second row of the table indicates that irrespective of the classification of subjects, there
is no significant difference between the delegation rates of rational and hindsight-biased
principals in Case 2.
Also regarding the comparisons across cases formulated in Observations (i),(ii), and (iii),
we find support for our theoretical predictions. First, independent of the categorization
method, we find that the delegation rates of rational principals are not significantly different
14 Appendix A.2 reports the estimated coefficients and standard errors for each categorization.
15 Tests are one-sided for directed hypotheses (Hypothesis 1, and Observation (ii) and (iii)) and two-sided for undi-
rected hypotheses (Hypothesis 2 and Observation (i)). Appendix A.3 gives further details and reports results for the
data without outliers.
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between the two cases. Second, hindsight–biased principals exhibit a decreased propensity
to delegate when they face a situation where the agent’s decision contradicts the state of the
world compared to situations where the agent’s decision and the state of the world coincide
(significant for the finals-task classification and the combined classification; marginally
significant for the goals-task classification). Finally, in line with Observation (iii), we find
that hindsight-biased principals show a stronger reduction in delegation rates than rational
principals when moving from Case 2 to Case 1 (significant for the combined classification
and marginally significant for the goals-task classification).
Our results are robust with respect to the exclusion of outliers (for the detailed anal-
ysis see Appendix A.3). We finally note that irrespective of the classification method the
unclassified subjects show no significant differences in behavior between Case 1 and Case
2.16
5. Discussion
Using a novel experimental design, we show that the hindsight bias can lead to subop-
timal delegation decisions. The hindsight bias plays a role when an economic actor has
imprecise information about the state of the world. Then, once the true state of the world
is revealed, hindsight-biased principals fail to remember their early assessment. Thus, in
a principal-agent relationship the principal’s confidence in herself relative to the agent is
not correctly updated. Hindsight-biased principals are frequently too self-confident and
therefore delegate too little, compared to rational principals. This finding sheds new light
on an established result in the principal-agent literature, namely that interim information
in a multi-period principal-agent relationship can mitigate distortions that originate in
asymmetric ex ante information or ex ante uncertainty. Our paper shows that this result
holds true for rational but not necessarily for hindsight-biased principals. In particular,
our results suggest that hindsight-biased principals (e.g., managers, doctors or venture
capitalists) can become even worse at evaluating the relative ability of their agents when
interim information is released relative to no interim information.
16 Regarding the comparison of all four cases there is one significant difference (out of 18 comparisons): Subjects who
are unclassified with respect to the finals task have significantly higher delegation rates in the cases with ω1 6= sP1 = a1
(68.6%, n = 35) than in the cases with ω1 = s
P
1 6= a1 (33.3%, n = 9). Excluding the outliers renders the difference
insignificant.
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As we have identified a specific source of the inability to delegate optimally, the question
arises as to which management instruments can be used to counteract the bias. Document-
ing the principal’s information at certain points in time can alleviate the effects of her
biased memory. For example, a manager could be forced to document evaluations of his
subordinates’ decisions before she knows whether these decisions turned out to be right or
not; or a venture capitalist could document his early assessment of the entrepreneur and
his venture.
On the other hand, providing the principal with interim information about the perfor-
mance of the agent creates inefficiencies when the principal is hindsight biased. Thus, more
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A.1. Observations classified as outliers by Grubbs’ maximum normed residual test.
Prediction Remembered Difference Explained by rational Decision to
Task ID Prediction behavior or hindsight bias delegate
Finals 91 100 0 -100 unexplained yes
382 3 100 97 hindsight bias no
Goals 40 31 5 -26 unexplained yes
135 60 89 -29 unexplained no
148 2 30 28 hindsight bias yes
157 210 60 150 hindsight bias yes
209 30 120 -76 unexplained no
263 36 86 -48 unexplained yes
360 40 70 -30 unexplained no
381 10 37 27 hindsight bias no
A.2. Probit regressions of principal’s type and information on delegation rate.
Propensity to delegate
Finals task Goals task Combined
Constant 0.577 0.452 0.253
(0.213) (0.198) (0.327)
Case 1 −0.146 0.250 0.655
(0.304) (0.323) (0.549)
Hindsight-biased −0.049 −0.021 0.483
(0.256) (0.255) (0.370)
Case 1*Hindsight-biased −0.250 −0.545 −1.242
(0.368) (0.393) (0.598)
n 229 203 150
logL −145.25 −129.85 −90.9
χ2(3) 4.58 4.33 7.73
Note: Values in brackets represent standard errors.
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B.1. Instructions for the agents: Round 1
Thank you for participating in our survey and the following little game!
Information regarding participation and lottery:
Among all participants we will raffle
5 x 2 cards for the 11-Friends-World Cup
on June 26, 2010, at 1 p.m.
We will contact you again on July 8 to conduct another survey and finish the game.
Then you will have the chance to win between 75 and 250 Euro. If you are among the winners, we will
contact you separately and transfer your earnings to your account.
Please answer the following seven questions:
1. Likelihood of Germany reaching the final of the World Cup 2010? (Please give a percentage between 0 to
100.)
Figure B.1 How questions were presented to the participants, e.g. question 1.
2. What is the likelihood Spain reaches the final of the World Cup 2010? (Please give a percentage.)
3. What is the likelihood Argentina reaches the final of the World Cup 2010? (Please give a percentage.)
4. What is the likelihood Italy drops out before the semi-final? (Please give a percentage.)
5. How many goals will be scored within the regular playing time (90 min.) during the eighth-final, quarter-
final and semi-final (14 matches overall)?
6. Suppose there are 100 people (including yourself) who – just like you – have just guessed how many goals
will be scored during the eighth-final, quarter-final and semi-final. These estimations can be ranked so
that the best estimation is first ranked. On which rank do you think you are with your estimate? Is your
estimation between
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• rank 1 and 10,
• rank 11 and 20,
• rank 21 and 30,
• rank 31 and 40,
• rank 41 and 50,
• rank 51 and 60,
• rank 61 and 70,
• rank 71 and 80,
• rank 81 and 90,
• rank 91 and 100?
Figure B.2 Determining the participants’ degree of overconfidence.
7. Which team is your personal favorite for winning the World Cup 2010?
Thank you for answering the previous questions.
Please read the following instructions very carefully and make the decisions you are asked for. You can win
a considerable amount of money for it. On July 11, we will hold a raffle for all participants of the game and
will draw 10 winners. If you are among the winners you will earn 75 Euro for each correct decision!
Imagine the following situation in which you will either take the role of the coach or of the
manager:
During this season the coach and the manager of the soccer club “SC World-Champion” have to decide
whether or not to buy a talented young player named Lion Elmess.
If the player evolves into a good player during the season, it is advantageous to have him as a member of
the team. If the player doesn’t evolve into a good player, it is not advantageous to have him as a member of
the team. A young player evolves into a good player in half the cases.
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Figure B.3 First decision task of the agents in stage one.
To guide their decision, both the coach and the manager turn to a talent scout. A talent scout can be of a
good or bad type. The coach as well as the manager cannot recognize the type of the talent scout. But the
trainer turns to a good talent scout in five out of 10 cases (50 percent) while the manager turns to a good
talent scout in only four out of 10 cases (40 percent) and in six out of 10 cases a bad type.
What distinguishes a good talent scout from a bad one?
The advice of a good talent scout is correct in two-thirds of cases. That is, in two out of three cases the
young player evolves into a good player if a good talent scout rated him as a good player. In the same way,
a young talent evolves into a bad player if a good talent scout rated him as a bad player.
In contrast, a bad talent scout can’t predict the development of a young player that well. He is correct
only in half the cases. If a bad talent scout rated a young player as a good player, he is correct only in one
of two cases. In the same way, a young player nevertheless evolves into a good player even if a bad talent
scout rated him as a bad player.
By pressing “Next” you will either get the role of the coach or the role of the manager and will have to
make your decision.
You are in the role of the coach.
You are given the following advice by the talent scout you turned to:
[“Lion Elmess seems to have great talent.”]
[“Lion Elmess seems to have insufficient talent.”]
Please decide whether or not to buy Lion Elmess. If your decision is correct (that means in favor of the
club), you win 75 Euro if you win the lottery.
[Buy]
[Don’t buy]
You will find out whether [your acquisition] turned out to be a good decision at the end of the season in
three weeks.
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You will find out whether [your decision not to buy Lion Elmess] turned out to be a good decision at the
end of the season in three weeks.
Before the start of the next season (in three weeks), both the trainer and manager have to decide again
whether or not to buy a young player named Lukas Hashüpfer.
Concerning the quality of the talent scout and the player’s feasible talent, the same assumptions as for
the decision regarding Lion Elmess hold.
In three weeks the manager has to decide whether she will leave the decision of whether or not to buy
Lukas Hashüpfer to you or whether she will take it herself.
For practical reasons we ask you to now take the decision whether or not to buy Lukas Hashüpfer in the
event of the manager leaving the decision to you. Again, you get 75 Euro should you win the lottery and if
your decision is correct.
Again, you ask your talent scout for her advice. It is the same talent scout you already asked with regard
to Lion Elmess. You get the following advice by your talent scout:
[“Lukas Hashüpfer seems to have great talent.”]
[“Lukas Hashüpfer seems to have insufficient talent.”]
Please decide now, whether or not to buy Lukas Hashüpfer for the next season:
[Buy]
[Don’t buy]
You will find out whether [your acquisition] turned out to be a good decision in three weeks.
You will find out whether [your decision not to buy Lukas Hashüpfer] turned out to be a good decision in
three weeks.
Thank you for participating!
We will contact you again on July 8 by email. Then you will get the chance to win between 75 and 250
Euro. If you are drawn for the tickets for the 11-Friends-World Cup, we will contact you on June 26.
B.2. Instructions for the agents: Round 2
Thank you for participating in the second stage of our survey and the following little game.
Information regarding participation and lottery:
Among the participants who complete the second stage of our game, we will inform those of you who have
won between 72 and 250 Euro. We will explain later on how you can win the prize.
During the first stage three weeks ago, you were asked to state the likelihood of certain
events in the course of the ongoing championship. You are now asked to remember your stated
likelihoods in this first stage as precisely as you can.
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The 10 participants who best remember their stated likelihoods in stage one will earn 100
Euro each. Only those participants who completed the entire second stage (including the game)
will be considered.
Argentina did not reach the final of the World Cup 2010.
1. What likelihood for Argentina reaching the final of the World Cup 2010 did you state in the last survey?
(Please give a percentage between 0 to 100.)
During the eighth-final, quarter-final and semi-final 37 goals were scored (within regular
playing time).
2. In the last survey, how many goals did you predict would be scored during the eighth-final, quarter-final
and semi-final?
Germany did not reach the final of the World Cup 2010.
3. What likelihood for Germany reaching the final of the World Cup 2010 did you state in the last survey?
(Please give a percentage.)
Spain did reach the final of the World Cup 2010.
4. What likelihood for Spain reaching the final of the World Cup 2010 did you state in the last survey?
(Please give a percentage.)
Italy was eliminated during the preliminary round and therefore did not reach the semi-final.
5. What likelihood for Italy being eliminated before the semi-final of the World Cup 2010 did you state in
the last survey? (Please give a percentage.)
(This question will not be taken into account because the outcome was already known within the first
stage of the survey.)
Three weeks ago you were given the role of the coach of the club SC World-Champion. As the coach, you
had to decide whether or not to buy the young talents Lion Elmess and Lukas Hashüpfer. You will now find
out whether your decisions turned out to be good or bad.
Three weeks ago you decided [to buy Lion Elmess].
Congratulations, the acquisition of Lion Elmess turned out to be a good one. Lion Elmess was a great
asset to the team. In the event of your winning the lottery, you will receive 75 Euro.
Three weeks ago you decided [not to buy Lion Elmess].
Unfortunately, this decision was a bad one and Lion Elmess turned out to have a great deal of talent.
Therefore you won’t get any money for this decision in the event of your winning the lottery.
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Furthermore, you decided [to buy Lukas Hashüpfer] three weeks ago.
Congratulations, the acquisition of Lukas Hashüpfer turned out to be a good one. Lukas Hashüpfer will
be a great asset to the team this season. You will get 75 Euro in the event of your winning the lottery.
Furthermore, you decided [not to buy Lukas Hashüpfer] three weeks ago.
Unfortunately, this decision was bad and Lukas Hashüpfer turned out to have a great deal of talent.
Therefore you won’t get any money for this decision in the event of your winning the lottery.
Thank you for participating!
We will contact you again if your name is drawn in the raffle on July 13. Should you have any further
questions, do not hesitate to contact us.
B.3. Instructions for the principals: Round 1
The instructions for the principals were exactly the same as for the agents, until they learned their role in
the delegation game:
You are in the role of the manager.
You are given the following advice by the talent scout you turned to:
“Lion Elmess seems to have great talent.”
“Lion Elmess seems to have insufficient talent.”
Please enter the advice you got in the following form.
Lion Elmess seems to have [Entry] talent.
For this season you will have to leave the decision whether or not to buy Lion Elmess to your coach. In the
meantime, your coach was also given advice by her talent scout and took the following decision: [Decision]
You have to wait until the season is over in order to find out whether your coach’s decision turned out to
be good. The season lasts until July 8. On that date we will contact you again and inform you as to whether
Lion Elmess evolved as a good or bad player, that is, whether your coach’s decision to buy or not buy Lion
Elmess turned out to be good. If the decision turns out to be good, you will win 75 Euro in the event that
you win the lottery.
Before the start of the next season (in three weeks), both the trainer and the manager have to decide
again whether or not to buy a young player named Lukas Hashüpfer. Concerning the quality of the talent
scout and the player’s feasible talent, the same assumptions hold as for the decision regarding Lion Elmess.
We will then ask you to decide, who – your coach or you yourself – will take the decision on Lukas
Hashüpfer.
Please keep in mind that you only take part in the lottery if you complete both parts of the game.
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Thank you for participating!
We will contact you again on July 8 by email. Then you will get the chance to win between 75 and 250
Euro. If you are drawn for the tickets for the 11-Friends-World Cup, we will contact you on June 26.
Instructions for the principals: Round 2
Thank you for participating in the second stage of our survey and the following little game.
Information regarding participation and lottery:
Among the participants who completed the second stage of our game, we will inform those of you who have
won between 72 and 250 Euro. We will explain later on how you can win the prize.
During the first stage three weeks ago, you were asked to state the likelihood of certain
events in the course of the ongoing championship. You are now asked to remember your stated
likelihoods in stage one as precisely as you can.
[...] Again, the way the principals’ remembered predictions were elicited was the same as for the agents.
Please remember the situation with regard to the first stage. You were given the role of the
manager of the club SC World-Champion:
Your coach had to decide whether or not to buy the talented player Lion Elmess. You will now find out
whether her decision turned out to be a good or bad decision.
For the next season a decision has to be taken as to whether or not to buy another talented young player
named Lukas Hashüpfer. You have to decide whether you will leave this decision to your coach or whether
you will take it yourself.
Basically, you are once again facing the following decision about the acquisition of a new player:
If the player evolves into a good player during the season, it is advantageous to have him as a member of
the team. If the player doesn’t evolve into a good player, it is not advantageous to have him as a member of
the team. A young player evolves into a good player in half the cases.
To guide their decision, both your coach and you as the manager turn to a talent scout. A talent scout
can be of good or bad type. The coach as well as the manager cannot recognize the type of the talent scout.
But the trainer turns to a good talent scout in five out of 10 cases (50 percent) while the manager turns to
a good talent scout in only four out of 10 cases (40 percent) and in six out of 10 cases a bad type.
What distinguishes a good talent scout from a bad one?
The advice of a good talent scout is correct in two-thirds of cases. That is, in two out of three cases the
young player evolves into a good player if a good talent scout rated him as a good player. In the same way,
a young talent evolves into a bad player if a good talent scout rated him as a bad player.
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In contrast, a bad talent scout can’t predict the development of a young player that well. He is correct in
only half the cases. If a bad talent scout rated a young player as a good player, he is correct only in one of
two cases. In the same way, a young player nevertheless evolves into a good player even if a bad talent scout
rated him as a bad player.
By pressing “Next” you will find out your coach’s decision in the last season (stage one) regarding Lion
Elmess.
The coach’s decision in the last season
After you and your coach turned to a talent scout last season, your coach decided to buy Lion Elmess. The
acquisition of Lion Elmess turned out to be a good one. Lion Elmess was a great asset to the team. In the
event of your winning the lottery, you will receive 75 Euro.
After you and your coach turned to a talent scout last season, your coach decided not to buy Lion Elmess.
Unfortunately, this decision was a bad one and Lion Elmess turned out to have a great deal talent. Therefore
you won’t get any money for this decision in the event of your winning the lottery.
Decision for the next season
For the next season, the decision whether or not to buy Lukas Hashüpfer has to be taken. You can take this
decision on your own or leave it to your coach. If you take it on your own, the same talent scout you turned
to last season will give you advice. If you leave the decision to your coach, she will also turn to the same
talent scout as last season.
If you take the decision on your own and your decision is a good one, you will earn 72 Euro in the event
of your winning the lottery.
If you leave the decision to your coach again and her decision is a good one, you will earn 75 Euro if you
win the lottery.
If your decision or the decision of your coach turns out to be bad you won’t earn any money.
 [I will take the decision regarding the acquisition of Lukas Hashüpfer on my own.]
 [I will leave the decision regarding the acquisition of Lukas Hashüpfer to my coach.]
You have decided to take the decision regarding Lukas Hashüpfer on your own.
You are given the following advice by your talent scout:
“Lukas Hashüpfer seems to have insufficient talent.”
“Lukas Hashüpfer seems to have a great deal of talent.”
Please decide now whether or not to buy Lukas Hashüpfer for the next season. If your decision is a good




Congratulations, the acquisition of Lukas Hashüpfer turned out to be a good one. Lukas Hashüpfer will
be a great asset to the team. In the event that you win the lottery, you will receive 72 Euro.
Unfortunately, this decision was a bad one and Lukas Hashüpfer turned out to have a great deal of talent.
Therefore you won’t get any money for this decision in the event that you win the lottery.
You have decided to leave the decision regarding Lukas Hashüpfer to your coach.
Your coach decided to buy Lukas Hashüpfer. Congratulations, the acquisition of Lukas Hashüpfer turned
out to be a good one. Lukas Hashüpfer will be a great asset to the team. In the event of your winning the
lottery, you will receive 75 Euro.
Your coach decided not to buy Lukas Hashüpfer. Unfortunately, this decision was a bad one and Lukas
Hashüpfer turned out to have a great deal of talent. Therefore you won’t get any money for this decision in
the event of your winning the lottery.
Please enter the advice you were given by your talent scout regarding Lion Elmess in stage one.
 “Lion Elmess seems to have great talent.”
 “Lion Elmess seems to have insufficient talent.”
Thank you for participating!
We will contact you again if your name is drawn in the lottery on July 13. Should you have any further
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